Measuring success in five African Anti-Corruption Commissions - the cases of Ghana, Malawi, Tanzania, Uganda & Zambia -

by
Alan Doig, David Watt & Robert Williams (Research Project Leader)
May 2005
U4 reports 2
U4 reports 3 Table of contents
Executive summary ..............................................................................................................4
PART I Overview.................................................................................................................8 1.1 The Approach and the issues........................................................................................................8
1.2 Our findings ....................................................................................................................................9
1.3 Our recommendations.................................................................................................................10 PART II The main themes of the research framework..................................................... 11 2.1 Introduction...................................................................................................................................11
2.2 The purpose of the research .......................................................................................................11
2.3 Hypotheses from the literature...................................................................................................12
2.4 Shaping the themes.......................................................................................................................13
2.5 Hypotheses from the literature for the field research .............................................................14 PART III What we were looking for and what we expected to find ................................. 16 3.1 ACC stages of organisational development ..............................................................................16
3.2 ACC and donor(s) relationship...................................................................................................17
3.3 ACC and government relationships...........................................................................................18
3.4 A supportive governance framework ........................................................................................19 PART IV What we found ................................................................................................... 21 4.1 The ACCs in Comparative Perspective.....................................................................................21
4.2 The general governance context.................................................................................................22
4.3 The general government context................................................................................................26
4.4 Relations between the ACC and Government.........................................................................29
4.5 Relations between the ACC and Donors..................................................................................31
4.6 Organisational development and maturity................................................................................35 PART V Failures in measuring success ............................................................................40 5.1 A Failure of measurement rather than in performance ..........................................................40
5.2 Effectiveness and parameters .....................................................................................................47
5.3 Our Recommendations................................................................................................................47 PART VI - Conclusion Improving performance measurement; improving performance 49 6.1 Improving performance...............................................................................................................50
6.2 Improving performance measurement......................................................................................52
6.3 Conclusion.....................................................................................................................................54 PART VII Country reports.................................................................................................55 7.1 Ghana .............................................................................................................................................56
7.2 Malawi ............................................................................................................................................61
7.3 Tanzania .........................................................................................................................................65
7.4 Uganda ...........................................................................................................................................73
7.5 Zambia ...........................................................................................................................................79 Annex ..................................................................................................................................85 Interviews ................................................................................................................................................85
Documentation.......................................................................................................................................87
Select bibliography .................................................................................................................................90
Abbreviations/Acronyms......................................................................................................................91
U4 reports 4 Executive summary
This Report has been developed from the literature review and evaluation presented in the First
Report (March, 2004). The findings here are based on the insights gained from five country visits
to Ghana, Malawi, Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia (July October, 2004).
The findings emerged from grouping previous explanations of ACC success, the inhibitors and
drivers as we term them, and matching them against the realities of the different countries. We
grouped the explanations into the following elements:
governance context role of governments (both local and donor) performance of ACCs
and, most crucially, what we discovered is the missing link in previous studies of ACCs:
the role of donors in promoting the success or failure of ACCs.
Our study found a lack of synchronicity and compatibility between the needs, aims, motivations,
capacities and expectations of governments, donors and ACCs. This leads to a lack of
coordination, complementarity and confidence between the three parties, which, in turn, is
connected to their differing lifecycles.
The lifecycle of a new ACC is characterized by initially high expectations from governments
and donors but the ACC is an infant organization unable to meet the unrealistic expectations
imposed upon it. This failure usually means that there is no sustained support for the ACC which
limits its capacity to develop as an organization. This failure to thrive encourages disillusionment
in governments, donors and in ACCs themselves.
ACC unable to
meet unrealistic expectations Cuts in funding
& impaired org. development Stakeholder disillusionment Initial high expectations
The lifecycle of governments involves the gradual displacement of anti-corruption as a high
priority and indeed political commitment is frequently confined to exposing the crimes of
previous regimes. Governments experience periods of instability and, where ACCs investigate
corruption at the highest political levels, the response is not often supportive. Rather, ACC
Directors are dismissed, authority to prosecute is withheld in sensitive cases and under-resourcing
of the ACC becomes the norm, further undermining its capacity and reputation.
When discredited governments are toppled or new leaders emerge, donors become enthusiastic
again and the neglected ACC is reborn or reconstituted. Where once donor support had been
U4 reports 5 difficult to obtain, or had even been withdrawn, suddenly there is a rush to support the ACC with
a new set of expectations. The previous famine of resources is replaced by a feast but the ACC
often lacks the infrastructure and capacity to make effective use of the sudden increase in funds.
Donor neglect is, at worst, replaced by donor competition and, at best, by inadequate and
irregular donor coordination.
The development cycle of ACCs is frequently assumed by governments and donors to be linear
but, in reality, it is sporadic, erratic and vulnerable to disruption by the volatility of government
support and by fluctuating donor enthusiasm and fatigue. Building an effective, successful
ACC requires organizational maturity based on consistent, sustained organizational
development. It is precisely these characteristics which are missing from the lifecycle experience
of ACCs in Africa.
A central problem is the measurement of ACC performance in particular the lack of
appropriate measurement tools and the widespread employment of inappropriate, unhelpful,
unrealistic and even counter-productive measures of performance. This creates a further
difficulty in differentiating between achievable and non-achievable organizational performance
and compounds the problem of distinguishing between factors which are within the ACCs
control and those that are not. Donors do not actually know if their funding has any impact on
corruption because they do not measure it. When they do measure, they often choose
inappropriate measures for the wrong reasons the Uganda Leadership Code is an extreme
example of the adverse consequences for the ACCs capacity of choosing the wrong measure of
ACC performance.
We suggest that the widespread lack of success of ACCs is intimately connected to how they
are funded by donors and governments and what donors and governments expect of them.
These expectations are not grounded in political or financial reality, nor are they approached
through a clear management development strategy and nor are they informed by a clear
understanding of the scale and complexity of corruption in the particular country.
In short, we argue that ACCs will never achieve success until they are consistently funded at the
right times, for the appropriately specified tasks, and at levels commensurate with a realistic level
of performance.
In Part III, we specify what we looked for as characteristic of a successful ACC in terms of
organizational development, relationships with donors and governments and what roles it
performs within the wider governance context.
Part IV of the Report describes what we found in practice and this helped specify the size of the
gap between what ought to happen and what actually is the case. The realities include seriously
deficient governance frameworks and hostile governmental contexts with weak accountability,
scrutiny and monitoring arrangements. In short, the anti-corruption architecture is generally ad hoc , poorly planned and inadequately executed. All ACCs have an uncomfortable relationship with their governments.
Donors relations with ACCs are similarly difficult with ACCs often being donor led. ACCs will
accept what donors are willing to make available and donors do so in terms of their own
priorities and plans. One common consequence is that funding goes to front-line activities but
the back-room organizational infrastructure is neglected.
U4 reports 6
ACCs remain organizationally immature and lacking in the key features of successful
organizations the use of business planning, functioning financial and management information
systems, effective decision-making processes integrated with resource allocation and realistic
performance indicators. Some features exist to an extent in some ACCs but the overall picture is
one of under-development.
Part V of the Report focuses on how assessing the success of ACCs has been made more
problematic by the choice and application of inappropriate and inaccurate performance
measurement criteria. Overall, we argue that failure is preordained by: the imposition of
unrealistic objectives, limiting necessary resources, inadequate support for sustainable
organizational development, inability to discriminate between intrinsic and extrinsic factors
affecting performance and lack of appreciation of the strength and impact of political pressure on
the ACC.
We identify a widespread failure to reconcile the scale and scope of the corruption problem with
the resources and capabilities of the ACC and the specific political context of each country.
Instead, the Hong Kong ICAC model has been carpet-bombed on the entire continent.
Attempts to replicate the Hong Kong success have been made regardless of prevailing political,
social and economic conditions, and the resources available to an ACC. All African ACCs subsist
in conditions far less propitious and with much scarcer resources and capabilities than the ACC
prototype. In effect, African ACCs have been consigned to a form of existence that not only
constrains, but almost guarantees their inability to attain achievable levels of success.
The emphasis here is on achievable levels of success rather than the unachievable and
unrealistic. Too often, governments and donors expect ACCs with inadequate resources,
unsophisticated investigative capabilities and operating within an undeveloped institutional
infrastructure to pursue high-level systematic corruption when, even in the most developed
societies, such pursuits are normally ineffective and unsuccessful. Catching the big fish always
seems attractive but the negative impact on the ACCs public credibility and capacity of
successive failed fishing expeditions cannot be under-estimated.
Any assessment of an ACCs success, we argue, is a comparative and relative process relating
activities undertaken and achievements attained within the scale and scope of corruption and an
evaluation of context. Essentially, evaluating performance achieved in relation to available
resources, level of capability employed and degree of difficulty in the operating environment. The
aim should be to seek an optimal level of performance based on country specific realism rather
than attempt to replicate the success of the Hong Kong ICAC achieved in a very different
environment.
Success has to be achievable and sufficient rather than complete.
Our specific findings and recommendations are:
1. Governments and donors must agree on what the best role of the ACC is focusing on
what they are good at and what they have the resources to achieve. 2. When ACCs lack competency and capacity to perform particular roles, these should be
divested or transferred to more suitable agencies. 3. Donors must identify and apply appropriate performance indicators in order to measure
ACC operational performance and organizational success.
U4 reports 7 4. ACCs require sustained, structured organizational development. 5. ACCs should have a single strategic plan that is suitable, politically acceptable and feasible
with appropriate and realistic performance measurement. Governments and donors
should fund the plan for a specified period but government funding must be core and
guaranteed. 6. Governments and donors must assess the optimal level of organizational performance
achievable in the ACCs operating environment. 7. Governments and ACCs should agree SMART objectives and relevant KPIs that are
annually reviewed by a third party (e.g. the legislature) and revised accordingly.
Part V concludes that none of the ACCs studied here have achieved success in the broad sense
of a discernible or measurable impact on levels of corruption although there is modest evidence
of some activity or output success. There is therefore no continental role model of success
against which the other countries can be measured but this study has identified those
environmental and contextual factors which are the least conducive to success.
ACC success in Africa is likely to be comparative, relative, partial and perspective-dependent. In
one sense, success is in the eye of the beholder.
Overall, there is a significant mismatch between the nature and scale of the corruption problem
and the capacities and resources of ACCs. We conclude, in Part VI, by suggesting that:
1. The roles of ACCs should be re-examined. The justification for continuing to
investigate low-level, petty corruption is not clear and the ability of any ACC to tackle
contemporary, very high level political corruption is also in question. Similarly the role in
community education on corruption needs greater justification. 2. A practitioner debate should begin on determining what should be the core function of
an ACC and how that function might link to wider reform objectives. By way of
illustration we give examples of ACCs working as corruption prevention organizations
and as local governance investigators. We also note what we would expect from an
ACC that chooses to focus only on high-level cases.
But whichever roles ACCs undertake, the need to measure their performance remains. Unless
and until the issues discussed in this Report are addressed, we see no realistic expectation of
success for ACCs or, indeed, developing the means to measure it.
U4 reports 8 PART I Overview 1.1 The Approach and the issues
The overall aims of this research project are to examine and articulate:
1. what constitutes success in terms of the operational performance and strategic management
of an Anti-Corruption Commission (ACC), 2. what are the political, economic and social factors supporting or constraining the degree of
success achieved by an ACC, 3. which particular configurations of the governance infrastructure are most likely to enhance an
ACCs capacity and capability to achieve success in reducing corruption.
The research project has been based upon in-depth examinations of the operation, operating
context and strategies of ACCs in Uganda, Ghana, Tanzania, Malawi and Zambia (chosen both
for their perceived state of organisational development and for the previous knowledge the team
have of 3 of the ACCs). The in-country and desk researches undertaken by the research team
suggest that the measurement of success by African ACCs is problematic in both concept and
assessment. We have taken an overview of the issues in the literature and come to a view on what
were often stated as the main inhibitors or drivers for success, factors reflecting the general
governance infrastructure. We have disaggregated the components of this infrastructure to
provide a contextual frame for an analysis and evaluation of the ACCs, and which informed the
fieldwork into the five ACCs. This examination of the literature is summarised in Part II and a
full analysis can be found in the First Report of this project which is posted on the U4 website.
To facilitate the process of examining the ACCs in organisational terms, evaluating their
operational performance and to prepare for this examination in terms of what we would expect
to find, we have employed four perspectives:
An understanding of ACCs as organisations: their status, role and responsibilities; the
evolution to their present organisational structure, their resource base and core competencies;
their current areas of activity, performance indicators and organisational development and
maturity in terms of the organisations ability to devise and deliver strategies that would
demonstrate success. An appreciation of the key dynamics in the ACC-donor relationship: the level and loci of
donor support to the ACC; longevity and stability of donor support; conditionality of the
support and ACC performance measures applied by the donor. A structural and cultural analysis of the nature of the relationship between each ACC and the
countrys government in terms of the delivery of anticorruption activities that support
U4 reports 9 governments progress in terms of wider objectives, such as diminution of corruption in the
delivery of government activities, in poverty alleviation or in democratisation. An analysis of each countrys governance infrastructure, and an evaluation of current
governance issues that support anti-corruption work, and the convergence of agencies with
whole- or part-responsibility for addressing corruption. Relations between the ACC and its government. The overall governance framework.
The expectations what we would expect to find under these four general headings are
discussed in Part III.
In Part IV we discuss what we found in practice.
In Part V we synthesise our findings in relation to the difficulties in measuring the performance
of ACCs and the related difficulties faced by ACCs in achieving success.
1.2 Our findings Overall we believe that the work of ACCs and their fundamental relations with governments and
donors are affected by gaps between appropriate and inappropriate measures of performance;
resultant difficulties in differentiating between achievable and non-achievable organisational
performance and the related failure to distinguish between the intrinsic (to the ACC) and
extrinsic factors affecting any change in the scope, scale and frequency of corruption in an
individual country.
As considered in Part V such gaps, difficulties and failures of expectation, measurement and
focus of analysis are exacerbated over time by three individual but inextricably interconnected
patterns or cycles of activity:
1. Government lifecycles 2. Donor lifecycles 3. ACC lifecycles
Governments, in setting up ACCs and in then supporting them, have variations in expectations
and roles. Changes in governments often mean that that cycle is interrupted, renewed or diluted.
Overall, there is no clear linear approach to how governments deal with ACCs.
Donors operate to their own cycle that is both dependent on staff and on what donors seek from
government within wider democratisation and anti-poverty objectives. What they fund, how they
fund and when they fund, and how they measure what that funding is for, is often donor-
focussed but also sometimes linked to the government cycle (e.g., the incoming government in
both recipient and donor countries)
ACCs are organisations with their own development cycle that is often assumed by donors (and
governments) to be linear. This is often not the case, and how ACCs develop, and what they do,
are often neither sequential, nor incremental. The question of organisational maturity is central to
this. How ACCs are funded by donors and governments, and what governments and donors
U4 reports 10 expect of them, is often not grounded in reality, nor approached through a clear management
development strategy.
Overall, what we have found is that the rhythm and interstices of the 3 cycles do not necessarily
match, nor are they complementary, and nor are they coordinated. The consequence is that most
of the ACCs do not deliver success, and that donors continue to promote assumptions about
ACCs that, as with other issues, continue to compound the problems they face. We discuss these
issues below, drawing particular attention to examples from the five country studies (see Part VII;
the Annex lists the interviews undertaken in, and the sources of information for, the fieldwork).
1.3 Our recommendations In summary, as outlined in Part VI, we recommend that:
governments and donors must agree on what the role of an ACC is focus now on what
they are good at, and what they have the resources and capacity to achieve, ACCs should avoid seeking to fulfil a wide range of roles for which they do not possess the
organisational competency and all such roles must either be divested entirely or delegated to
other agencies, ACCs require continuing structured organisational development, all ACCs must have a single strategic plan that is suitable, acceptable and feasible, with
appropriate and realistic performance measurement and is regularly reviewed and revised, donors and governments should only fund activities within strategic plans over a stated time-
horizon and government funding must be core and assured, governments and ACCs should agree SMART objectives and relevant Key Performance
Indicators (KPI) that are annually reviewed by a third party (such as the legislature) and
revised accordingly.
In sum, we argue that the future purpose and roles of ACCs will not achieve success
until they are funded at the right time, for the right activity and at a level appropriate and
commensurate with the scale of performance standards to be achieved.
U4 reports 11 PART II The main themes of the research framework 2.1 Introduction This part outlines the purpose of the research, the hypotheses from the literature and the
resultant framework of analysis for the field research. The submitted First Report describes the
purpose of the research, and the questions to be addressed. To establish the questions, a database
search of the literature of ACCs was undertaken. From the analysis of the results, a number of
hypotheses were established, from which a number of more detailed questions were developed
for use in the fieldwork.
2.2 The purpose of the research The research is intended to:
1. analyse the generic assumptions behind the establishment, functions and benefits of ACCs, 2. analyse the assumptions and rationales for funding ACCs in Africa with reference to their
contemporary context, 3. examine the benefits claimed by their advocates and sponsors, 4. examine the criticisms of ACC, 5. develop themes on performance and performance measurement to be assessed within the
context of the case studies, 6. deliver a report intended to inform policy makers about the key factors they need to consider
when deciding whether to help establish, expand, reform, restructure or dissolve anti-
corruption commissions.
The areas to be explored through the fieldwork stage of the project are as follows:
1. an overview of the growth and development of anti-corruption commissions, 2. analysis of the key issues concerning their effectiveness, 3. observations on country context, donor funding and the performance of designated African
anti-corruption commissions, 4. case studies of Ghana, Malawi, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia which evaluate the issue of
performance and performance measurement for African anti-corruption commissions, 5. factors affecting the effectiveness and performance of ACCs in terms of success and
measurement criteria.
The overall aim of the research project is to specify:
1. what constitutes 'success' for an ACC,
U4 reports 12 2. which environments are most conducive to ACC success, 3. whether particular configurations of institutional architecture, legal jurisdiction, administrative
infrastructure, agency mission and political culture are most likely to enhance the prospects
for 'success' in reducing corruption. 2.3 Hypotheses from the literature Reasons for the success or failure of ACCs in Africa and elsewhere vary and there is no
unanimity on the relative importance of one reason against another. But it is possible to discern
sets of reasons which appear frequently in the literature. These include:
2.3.1 The inhibitors of success Lack of political commitment Adverse economic context A failure of governance institutions generally Inadequate, ambiguous, ineffective and unenforceable laws on corruption Inappropriate structures, pressures, priorities, and focus ACCs are seen as failures when they are inefficient and ineffective organisations which
consistently fall short of what is expected of them Low public confidence and trust in ACCs (excluding the Hong Kong ICAC model, which
many ACCs have been set up to emulate) 2.3.2 The drivers of success Political will and broad political support Medium rather than very high levels of corruption. Where corruption is endemic and
pervasive, ACCs function in form but not in substance 1 ACC is situated in a comprehensive anti-corruption strategy supported by effective and
complementary public bodies Economic stability and a focus on reducing incentives and opportunities for corruption, for
example, carefully managed privatisation programmes Adequate financial resources and skilled staff A clear and relevant mission focusing less on punishment and more on corruption
prevention, supported by appropriate business planning, budgeting and performance
measurement regimes Appropriate legal frameworks, including the rule of law, and sufficient legal powers for
investigative and preventive work Operational independence and freedom from political interference High standards of integrity in ACC leaders and staff Public awareness of, and confidence in, the ACCs mission 1 Huther, Jeff and Shah, Anwar, 'Anti-Corruption Policies and Programs: A Framework for Evaluation', Washington D.C., World Bank, 2000, p.12.
U4 reports 13 2.4 Shaping the themes In order to shape our fieldwork we identified a number of areas we wished to address and, in so
doing, felt it useful to group the above themes to address the levels we were able to identify from
our previous work with various ACCs as those at which ACCs work: organisational, government-
related, and governance. These are:
Organisational development and maturity in terms of the organisations ability to devise
and deliver strategies that would demonstrate success or failure
Inappropriate structures, pressures, priorities, and focus contribute to ACC failure ACCs are seen as failures because they are inefficient and ineffective organisations which
consistently fall short of what is expected of them Adequate financial resources and skilled staff A clear and relevant mission focusing less on punishment and more on corruption
prevention, supported by appropriate business planning, budgeting and performance
measurement regimes High standards of integrity in ACC leaders and staff
Relations between the ACC and its government in terms of the delivery of anticorruption
activities that support governments progress in terms of wider objectives, such as
diminution of corruption in the delivery of government activities, in poverty alleviation or
in democratisation
Lack of political commitment Appropriate legal frameworks, including the rule of law, and sufficient legal powers for
investigative and preventive work Operational independence and freedom from political interference
The overall governance framework that would provide popular and governmental support
for anti-corruption work, and the convergence of agencies with whole- or part-
responsibility for addressing corruption
Economic context A failure of governance institutions generally contributes to the failure of ACCs Inadequate, ambiguous, ineffective and unenforceable laws on corruption contribute to ACC
failure Public confidence and trust in ACCs is low (excluding Hong Kong and Singapore) and they
command little public support Public awareness of, and confidence in, the ACCs mission Political will and broad political support Medium rather than very high levels of corruption. Where corruption is endemic and
pervasive, ACCs 'function in form but not in substance'
U4 reports 14 ACC is situated in a comprehensive anti-corruption strategy supported by effective and
complementary public bodies Economic stability and a focus on reducing incentives and opportunities for corruption, for
example, carefully managed privatisation programmes
Additionally (and one area not developed in the literature) we were also aware of the importance
of the ACC-donor relationship. Thus we also include a fourth and final area:
Relations between the ACC and donors that support and sustain those strategies
It was evident in all of the countries studied that donors tried to balance the principle of
encouraging an ACC to determine their scope and scale and direction (i.e. the ACCs strategies)
with the need to achieve a strategic fit with elements of the wider donor agenda of poverty
alleviation, good governance, public sector capacity-building, market-based reforms etc.
2.5 Hypotheses from the literature for the field research To assess these four areas, the reasons have to be interpreted from the perspective of an ACC.
Thus, from the literature, we have developed a set of more detailed issues that would help us
shape our questions for the fieldwork in Ghana, Malawi, Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia:
Were the ACCs created in those countries created to lead, or make some contribution to, anti-corruption strategies? add quasi legitimacy to kleptocratic regimes? create a sense of real or false security for foreign investors? appease donor and or public opinion? try an approach that had worked in another country? do something because doing nothing was not an option?
What is the operating environment of the ACC? What is the overall scope, scale and loci of corruption extant in the country? Does the political economic and governance environment provide supportive conditions and
factors? Which other agencies exist and what are their individual and inter-related roles, authority and
responsibility?
What is the impact of the ACC? What is its public profile and political impact? Is it perceived by the public as a positive or negative force? Does the ACC have areas of particular strength or weakness? Is its authority acknowledged by other agencies with areas of responsibility for anti-
corruption?
U4 reports 15 What is the mission of the ACC? Does it address the symptoms or causes of corruption? Is it comprehensive or selective? Is it preventive or investigative? Is it appropriate to local conditions and corruption problems? Is it linked to governments wider development strategies.
What is the organisational efficiency and effectiveness of the ACC? Is the ACC judged by appropriate and reliable performance measures? How is the ACC performing against the measures applied? Are alternative performance frameworks available?
Are the resources and tasks of the ACC appropriate? Who sets and controls the budget? Do donors provide on or off budget funding? Can the tasks be changed to fit the resources or vice versa? What decision-making policies and mechanisms are in place for case acceptance and
prioritisation
What is the status and standing of the ACC? What level of political support does the ACC have? Is it subject to political interference or control? Is it subordinate to other institutions?
Before undertaking the fieldwork, further background research was undertaken on what we
would expect to find in the five countries. The findings are discussed in Part III.
U4 reports 16 PART III What we were looking for and what we expected to find
This part outlines the approach followed to contextualise the field research. It was clear from the
research for the First Report that the extent and depth of the context information we should
access was much greater than originally envisaged. Accordingly we undertook substantial work
into organisational development, strategic planning, corruption measurement and governance
frameworks. Indeed, each of these topics would be worthy of a research report in its own right.
We have sought to distil and synthesise our findings to provide a framework and context through
which to assess ACCs. These are discussed below as series of questions.
3.1 ACC stages of organisational development What is the relationship between an ACCs stage of organisational development and
maturity in terms of its capacity and capability to devise and deliver strategies that would
demonstrate success or failure?
Any organisation should be able to provide evidence relating to:
life-cycle its development and growth, reflecting organisational stability and maturity in the
delivery of its objectives, strategy delivering its objectives in terms of competences and capacity (can it deliver?),
acceptability (delivering what its customers and stakeholders expect), feasibility (are its
objectives realistic and is it resourced accordingly?) measurement - demonstrating that, as an organisation, it is effective in delivering its
objectives, both internally and from an external perspective, and it has the means to measure
that effectiveness.
While one can clearly look both for the evidence of performance measurement and for the
suitability of those measures, it is also important to look for the underpinning organisational,
decision-making and budgetary processes, and management activity that provide the context. In
other words, any performance measurement process should be the reflection of the
organisations delivery of what it has determined is its core business - performance indicators or
measures exist to confirm how far an organisation delivers that core business. The setting of
targets requires a strategy. Strategy lays down what the ACC intends to do, what resources it has,
how it delivers its goals and how it is to be measured. Strategy is about the formulation,
implementation and responsibility for plans and related activities vital for the central direction
and functioning of the enterprise as a whole. 2 2 S. Booth.(1993). Crisis Management Strategy. London: Routledge. p63.
U4 reports 17 This involves organisational design - an understanding of the strategic roles of the divisions,
departments or subsidiaries of the organisation, as well as the role of the corporate centre...there
are different styles of managing the parenting role of the corporate centre, ranging from the
centralised masterplanner approach through to a highly devolved approach... - and
organisational configuration - how this is made up of different building blocks and co-ordinating
mechanisms...the issue is the extent to which a particular configuration best fits or supports
different kinds of strategies. 3 Strategy in a less developing country context where resources are limited and unstable also
requires either prioritisation or incremental development in terms of becoming effective in its
core business and would require a process that would determine various questions.
Should the focus be on raising public awareness of the costs of fraud and corruption and
creating sufficient ground swell of opinion to start having an effect on influencing
government to further efforts to address corruption? Should the ACC be investigating the systems and procedures within governmental and
parastatal organisations and, where necessary, for example, developing, implementing and
administering secure and corruption-proof tendering procedures? Should its efforts be directed towards the investigation of major fraud and corruption? Should the focus be on petty corruption as this is perhaps the area of greatest concern to
ordinary people? Is it a combination of these and others and, if so, what are the relative priorities? In other words, any study into performance measurement would also be assessing how far the
ACCs had: business planning and management processes, functioning financial management and
management information systems; effective organisational and administrative support systems;
effective decision-making procedures, integrated with those concerned with resource allocation;
delineation of responsibilities; realistic performance indicators or measurement; and so on. In
other words, are the ACCs functioning organisations in a stable operating environment with
clear, consistent and realisable objectives, appropriately resourced over a realistic timescale? 4 3.2 ACC and donor(s) relationship How does the relationship between an ACC and its donor(s) support and sustain an
ACCs capability to identify and achieve its strategic objectives?
The liberal democratic model is integral to the mainstream of the current donor development
agenda, which prioritises the interests of the poor and marginalised in the context of an enabling
state. It is also why corruption should be seen as a core restraint to the achievement of that
agenda. While conflict, gender discrimination (feminisation of poverty), trade and other structural
barriers, are also key restraints, corruption is often used as shorthand for lack of progress because
it reveals, somewhat crudely, where the real interests of the public officeholders lie. Its prevalence
3 G. Johnson and K. Scholes. (1997) Exploring Corporate Strategy. Hemel Hempstead: Prentice Hall. p402. (Italics in original). 4 For a more expanded discussion, see A. Doig, J. Moran and D. Watt. (2001) "Managing Anti-Corruption Agencies", Forum on Crime and Society. 1:1; A. Doig and J. Moran. (2002). Anti-Corruption Agencies: The Importance of Independence for the Effectiveness
of National Integrity Systems in C. Fijnaut and L. Huberts. (ed). (2002). Corruption, Integrity and Law Enforcement. Kluwer
Law International.
U4 reports 18 has been targeted by donors because of the current attitudes toward the delivery and impact of
the aid agenda (of which the current situation in Kenya is a case in point).
In May 2000 the Utstein Four - the International Development Ministers of the Netherlands,
Germany, Norway and the United Kingdom - announced that they intended to work together in
reducing the damaging effects of corruption which diverts scarce resources from development,
deters investment and retards economic growth...undermines democratic political systems and is
a barrier to the delivery of basic services and the provision of security to the poor. 5
On the ground, the focus on corruption should be seen as mainstream to donor activities and
should be the subject of cooperative and coordinated actions. Specifically, and again drawing on a
number of the concerns and issues expressed in previous work, this should include evidence of:
consideration of the suitability or transferability of reforms, suitable pre-funding assessment to ensure ACC capacity to deliver, consistency and integration of donor support, funding properly focused on the ACC strategy, and in particular on serving the public, funding integrated with own-government expenditure, sequenced donor funding that reflects an ACCs organisational capacity and maturity, business planning and effective measurement, funding that seeks complementarity or added-value with the work of agencies also engaged in
anti-corruption work.
3.3 ACC and government relationships How does the relationship between the ACC and its government influence the delivery of
anticorruption activities that support governments progress in terms of wider objectives,
such as diminution of corruption in the delivery of government activities, in poverty
alleviation or in democratisation?
Assessing the work of an ACC is only part of the task. An organisation may be highly effective in
terms of internal planning, resource allocation and delivering its targets. But an ACC is
established to fight corruption; its work, however successful, is of little use if the country is
perceived to be becoming more corrupt or where the government does not understand or
acknowledge the role in fighting corruption as part of a wider reform or developmental agenda.
Put another way, the purpose of an ACC as part of the governmental structure is to move that
structure away from corruption and toward whatever type of state the developmental agenda is
promoting.
At present the development agenda prioritises a democratic state, promoting short- and long-
terms goals toward what might be termed the core components of the liberal democratic model:
political legitimacy for the state through universal suffrage and regular elections; the peaceful
transfer of power; an effective political opposition and representative government; accountability
5 Maastricht. (2000). Report of the Working Conference on Anti-Corruption. Sponsored by the Netherlands Ministry for Foreign Affairs with the collaboration of the World Bank Institute (WBI).
U4 reports 19 through transparency of decision-making and the provision of information; separation of powers;
effective scrutiny of financial expenditure and challenge to official decisions; effective standards
of conduct in public office; official competencies such as impartially-recruited and well-trained
public servants; realistic social and welfare policies and low defence expenditure; human and civil
rights as indicated by freedom of religion, association, expression and movement, as well as rights
of review, complaint and redress against decisions or actions of the state; impartial and accessible
criminal justice systems; a free media; and the absence of arbitrary government power. 6
These goals are aspirational, but they do reflect the purpose of the reform process. It would be
expected that governments would determine the relationship between the existence of an ACC
and the wider reform objectives. It would therefore also be expected that governments and the
ACC would discuss and agree its strategy (in relation to its KPIs) and then provide the ACC the
operational independence and resources to deliver that strategy. While we would look to
measures of operational independence and accountability such as reporting to the legislature, we
do not subscribe to theories of absolute independence. As public sector organisations, ACCs are
dependent on and accountable to government for their funds and their performance. What we
would look to find is:
recognition that an ACC is part of wider government responsibilities, and governments
should be in transparent dialogue with an ACC over its strategic role and its resourcing, measurement and assessment of an ACCs performance by the legislature or other non-
Executive institution, recognition within wider government strategies of the role and purpose of the ACC.
3.4 A supportive governance framework What constitutes the overall governance framework that provides popular and
governmental support for anti-corruption work, and the convergence of agencies with
whole- or part-responsibility for addressing corruption?
Good governance is concerned not just with the organisation and activity of government - its
economy and efficiency - but also the ends to which they are put - its effectiveness and impact -
in terms of achieving levels of economic, human and institutional development and of providing
its citizens with protection from the vagaries of the market and with the basic infrastructures and
services for their well-being. This in turn, embeds the democratic ideal whereby, in underwriting
the well-being of its citizens, the developed state seals its contract with civil society whose
interests are its primary purpose to serve. Democracy and good governance should, in
encompassing a mix of participation, impartiality, public service, public interest, accountability,
responsibility, inclusion, grievance and redress, preclude the need, incentive and opportunity for
corruption.
It would be expected that governments with growing economies, widening democratisation
(including decentralisation and state divestment policies) would ensure that ACC strategy and
6 Drawn from Doig, A. (1999). In the State we Trust? Democratisation, Corruption and Development, Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics Vol 37, No 3 and Doig, A. and Theobald, R. (1999). Introduction: Why Corruption?, Journal of Commonwealth
and Comparative Politics Vol 37, No 3, pp1-12.
U4 reports 20 resources would be developed in tandem, both to ensure the anti-corruption dimension that
could be attached to such wider reforms was addressed and help deliver them through its own
KPIs. At the same time governments anti-corruption approaches would take cognisance of the
value of the national integrity approach where the added-value is the promotion of
interdependence horizontal integration - between agencies (sharing staff, training, cases,
information; agreeing areas of responsibility to avoid overlap) so that state institutions with
regulatory, audit and investigations functions, including ACCs, have complementary roles in
promoting a national anti-corruption agenda.
U4 reports 21 PART IV What we found
This part describes the findings from the field research. It begins the basic facts about the
organisations at issues, then goes on with the context governance and the general issue of
corruption in the five countries through donors to the activities of the ACCs. We consider that
a full understanding of the ACC is best discussed once context is established. This has been
achieved through a focus on governance, with a more detailed look at governmental activities,
before addressing the activities of donors and, finally, those of ACCs.
4.1 The ACCs in Comparative Perspective The table below presents some comparative data on the ACCs. Four of the countries possess a
stand-alone ACC but, in Ghana, corruption investigation is divided between two organisations.
The statistics were collected at the time of the country visits (July October, 2004) and should be
treated with caution. The data may be out of date and quantitive indicators are not always
compiled on the same basis. It has not been possible to verify some of the statistics and it may be
that some reflect optimistic assumptions. The lack of consistent, reliable and directly comparable
data is a major obstacle to the comparative analysis of ACCs in Africa.
Five countries were visited. Apart from Ghana, each has a stand-alone Anti-Corruption Agency
or Commission: in Ghana corruption is investigated by two agencies. The following table
summarises data common to each of the agencies:
Country Ghana Malawi Tanzania Uganda Zambia Agency SFO CHRAJ ACC PCB IG ACC Date established 1993 1993 1995 1991 1986 1982 reorganised 1996 Main
Directorates/
Functions Criminal Investigations Maladministration; human rights Investigation Prevention Education Investigation Education Research, Control & Statistics Investigation Prevention Education Investigation Prevention Education Own Prosecution No No Yes No Yes Yes Establishment 182 750 78 714 280 255 Number of
Investigators 80 + 10 140 30 200 30 85 Number of cases
annually 68 12,000 c.100 c.175 c.300 c.400 Main type of
cases where
known Fraud; Misappropriat ion Employment rights; Family rights issues Bribery; Misappropri- ation Bribery Maladmin- istration Fraud; Maladmin- istration Bribery; Misappropri- ation Funding Wholly own government Wholly own government Mixed Mixed Mainly own government Mixed Main donor
involvement GTZ USAID; DANIDA DFID UNDP EU Comm. UNDP DFID Reporting to
Ministry of Justice Parliament Ministry of Justice Office of the President Parliament President
U4 reports 22 Nonetheless, there are some obvious points of similarity and contrast. The largest organisation
CHRAJ in Ghana is untypical in size and its main activities are not concerned with corruption.
Of the stereotypical ACCs the PCB in Tanzania is much the largest and is nine times the size of
the ACB in Malawi though there is no evidence to suggest it is any more, let alone nine times
more, effective.
In Ghana and Uganda, the organisations are principally funded by their own governments but in
the others there is a large reliance on donor support.
Although anti-corruption organisations were funded in Zambia, Uganda and Tanzania a
generation ago, the organisations under review are essentially products of the new interest in
fighting corruption in the 1990s. Even the organisations funded earlier have been refocused,
reorganised and relocated in recent years.
In most cases, ACCs are dependent on other parts of government, usually the Attorney-General
or DPPs office, for permission to prosecute and this helps confirm that, whatever, the
independent status of ACCs, they are often subject to political control of prosecution decisions.
Equally, the funding dependency of ACCs on governments and donors suggests they are not in
full control of their own strategies, staffing and activities.
The statistics show that, although investigation has long been seen as the primary purpose of
African ACCs, the reality is that only a relatively small proportion of staff are involved in
investigations, for example, in Uganda only about 10% of staff. In contrast, in the most
specialised investigation agency, the SFO in Ghana, the proportion of investigators rises to about
half of the staff total. Again, caution needs to be maintained in the precise classification of staff
but the differences in proportions are quite striking.
There are areas where statistics are missing and patchy. In particular, it is hard to compare the
relative monetary values of investigations and it is even more difficult to specify the status of
those investigated or prosecuted. A large number of investigations can signify high investigative
productivity but it might also indicate a strategy of targeting petty and politically uncontroversial
corruption by low level officials. Large scale investigations of high level political figures are
extremely costly in staff and other resources and a decision to prioritise these will have negative
implications for the volume of investigations.
The data reveals nothing about the political will of host governments but it does indicate the
spread of donor support. Nor does it reveal the extent of public confidence in the effectiveness
of the ACC. In general, what evidence of public opinion that does exist suggests that none of the
ACCs is regarded by African publics as a success.
4.2 The general governance context The NIS studies 7 provide concise assessments of the governance framework in 4 of the 5 countries. A summary of the of the NIS studies for Malawi, Uganda, Zambia and Ghana is 7 The extracts come from specific completed country reports, in the case of Ghana, this was as part of a project involving the National Integrity System (NIS) in 18 countries for the 2001 Global II conference and, for Malawi, Uganda, and Zambia, this was
U4 reports 23 provided below, drawn from research undertaken in 2003 but whose main themes remain
pertinent now (the evaluation of Tanzanias governance framework and governmental context is
based upon the research teams desk and field research).
4.2.1 Ghana On the face of the institutional arrangements in place are enough to promote
national integrity. But the reality is different. The actual ability of the constitutional,
legal and political orders to promote national integrity and the control of corruption
is undermined severely by a number of factors. They include: lack of operational and
financial independence on the part of Parliament and the Judiciary;
executive/presidential dominance over those institutions. In the case of Parliament,
Executive dominance arises from the constitutional fusion of powers, especially the
extensive powers of the President, including appointment of MPs as ministers; most
of the existing integrity bodies such as CHRAJ and SFO depend on the Attorney
General for prosecution. But AG is politically partisan position and operates with a
keen eye on political profit; the government has tended to comply with the rules and
procedures in a minimalist and lackadaisical manner; there is no comprehensive
legislation on public ethics and anti-corruption. Instead, there are a multiplicity of
laws and methods for tackling corruption which makes the terrain extremely murky,
full of conflict, forum shopping and loopholes; the mandate boundaries between key
anti-corruption bodies such as CHRAJ, SFO and Auditor General are not fully clear,
especially in terms of who takes primary responsibility for public officers asset
declaration; despite frequent and sometimes credible media allegations and
occasionally proven allegations of corruption in high places, there has never been an
instance of prosecution or punishment of a key regime insider in the last decade. 4.2.2 Malawi [The NIS study was completed before the change of government in Malawi in 2004 but its
conclusion, that the institutions of government are weak, remains valid]: The institutions of governance are weak. Values of accountability and transparency
are not yet a reality in the public and private sector. Democracy is still emerging in
the country and the participation of people is rarely encouraged for fear that this may
put leaders in the spotlight. Research has shown that institutions of governance in
the country are weak. Political parties, the civil service, courts, non-governmental
institutions and the police are facing difficulties making adjustments to ensure good
governance. For example, the police are largely accused of performing biased acts
against citizens. The state itself has failed to deliver on promises made during
election campaigns has meant that the State can only survive by corruptly co-opting
or annihilating its critics and opponents. The buying of opposition politicians,
rampant political beatings and patronage in the country are seen as tools for
bolstering the weak State and its regime in power. The economic base of the state is as part of a 22-country study project relating to Commonwealth countries funded by DfID. Both projects were funded through
Transparency International and supervised by Alan Doig.
U4 reports 24 weak and donors have since predicted that if they do nothing, the economy in
Malawi may collapse. 4.2.3 Tanzania It is evident from the sheer volume of institutional redesign and reform that Tanzania, under the
Presidency of Mpaka, has indicated its commitment to the promotion of good governance.
Significant initiatives during this period have included: the issuing of A National Framework on
good governance, identifying priority areas for development within the countrys system of
governance; the establishment of the Parastatal Sector Reform Programme, Judiciary Reform
Programme, Human Rights Commission and Civil Service Reform Programme.
Although Tanzania has established a comprehensive poverty monitoring system the activities of
these reform programmes and tangible improvements to the lives of the vast majority or
Tanzanias are to date less evident. The United States 2005 Congressional Budget Justification
for Tanzania described Tanzanias democracy as fragile and cited continuing problems in
poverty alleviation with 40% of Tanzanians being unable to meet their daily subsistence needs,
59% enrolment rates for compulsory primary education, life expectancy at 50 years and falling
and infant mortality at 104 per 1000 and rising.
In 2004 the United States grouped Tanzania among 16 countries which failed to meet criteria on
governance required for qualification for funding from the Millennium Challenge Account,
available only to those countries that govern justly, invest in their people and encourage
economic freedom. Tanzania had failed because of its continuing corruption problems that
affect its Executive, Legislature and Judiciary and local government at municipal, sub-municipal
and district levels.
In essence the elements of an effective NIS for Tanzanias have yet to get past the design-and-
build stage. The accountability mechanisms intended to monitor the activities of the members of
all areas and tiers of government e.g. the Public Leadership Code of Ethics, the Human Rights
and Good Governance Commission, the Ethics Inspectorate and the Good Governance all in
existence. All, however focus their activities on the collection of information and then maintain a
bureaucratic camouflage which ensured that access to resultant information is circumscribed and
any application of the information collected is rendered useless.
Similarly the operational activities and effectiveness of the countrys investigative and watchdog
agencies are constrained by inadequate resources, politicised control and institutionalised low
level of morale and high level of inertia.
Civil society though relatively free remains largely undeveloped. The principal media agencies are
under direct or indirect political control via licensing and financing and the independent media
less fully developed in terms of staff capability and scale and scope of publication and broadcast
coverage. More positive signs of civil society are apparent in the activities of community based
organisations and national NGOs working to seek improvements in environmental pollution, and
public service delivery.
U4 reports 25 4.2.4 Uganda Research has shown that the official legal framework of the Uganda integrity system
institutions is by and large satisfactory in terms of anticorruption measures, but the
problem is with implementation in case of the IG, DPP and Police. Instances of the
NIS not working are there. Civil society worships the rich regardless of the means
and sources of the wealth. The Attorney General failed to institute charges against
corrupt officials dismissed from the Electoral Commission a